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Abstract: This study investigates the allocation of China’s R&D subsidies and its 
effectiveness in stimulating firms’ own R&D investments for the population of Chinese 
listed firms throughout the time period 2001 to 2006. For allocation, we find that firm 
participation is determined by prior grants, high quality inventions, and minority state-
ownership. Provincial variation in China’s transition towards a market-driven economy 
reveals that R&D subsidies are less often distributed by more market-oriented 
provincial governments and that China’s innovation policy is more supportive of firms 
located in developed provinces. Considering effectiveness, we find that grants 
instantaneously crowd-out firms’ own R&D investments but are neutral in later periods. 
In 2006, one public RMB reduces own R&D investments made by firms by half a 
RMB. For repeated recipients, high-tech firms, and minority state-owned firms grants 
have an insignificant effect.  
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1 Introduction  
At the onset of the millennium, China’s State Council has decided to accelerate 
economic development through innovation, high-technology, and industrialization (Liu et al. 
2011). Research and development (R&D) operations have increasingly been relocated from 
public research institutes to firms in state and non-state sectors to increase China’s general 
scope of industrial R&D and to contribute to the economy’s technological sovereignty (Liu 
2009). In addition, the government has provided substantial funding, in particular to inventive 
high-tech firms which are supposed to become main drivers of China’s technological 
trajectory.  
From 2001 to 2006, China’s public support for industrial innovation amounts to 450 
billion RMB, with two-thirds coming from R&D funds, and contributed 60% to industrial 
R&D investments (Ministry of Finance (MOF) 2014). Throughout the same period, the 
industrial contribution to China’s gross expenditures for R&D has been increasing from 60% 
to 71%. Measured as a ratio to GDP, industrial R&D investments accelerated from 0.58% to 
0.99% and gross R&D expenditures improved from 0.95% to 1.39% (MOF 2014, National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 2014).  
Although these figures suggest an increase in industrial R&D in relative and absolute 
terms, the effect of China’s R&D subsidies remains unclear. As pointed out by Arrow (1962), 
due to market failure in the production of knowledge R&D investments of firms may remain 
below the social optimum and require correction by public subsidies. However, if the effect of 
government subsidies on firms’ own R&D investments is negative or not significant then the 
economic justification for continuing support in its existent form is considerably undermined. 
In China’s case, the recurrent underachievement of national R&D targets throughout the last 
decade indeed questions the effectiveness of policy measures employed and thus requires a 
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careful examination of the effectiveness of China’s R&D subsidies on industrial R&D 
investments.1  
Because prior studies on China’s R&D subsidies are small in numbers and often suffer 
from methodological limitations, we aim to contribute new evidence to the literature. We 
estimate the effect of receiving R&D subsidies by investigating differences in own R&D 
investments of recipients and otherwise comparable non-recipients over time. To control for 
selection bias in the distribution of grants we derive robust estimates by combining non-
parametric propensity-score matching (PSM) with a difference-in-differences (DID) 
estimator.  
This econometric strategy is employed to a unique panel on the population of Chinese 
listed firms, observed throughout the time period 2001 to 2006. We match firm level data 
from annual reports with numerous data sources, including patent data from the European 
Patent Office’s Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) and export data from 
Chinese Customs. An exhaustive set of variables is operationalized to explain which firm 
characteristics actually determine the allocation of R&D subsidies. Because inventiveness and 
high-tech orientation of firms are supposed to accelerate China’s technological trajectory, we 
place particular emphasis on these characteristics.  
We briefly foreshadow our findings. For allocation, we find that firm participation is 
determined by high quality inventions whereas high-tech sector affiliation is less important. 
Further, our results show persistence in receiving R&D subsidies. Against the background of 
transition from a centrally planned to a mixed market economy, we take interest in 
implications for grant distribution which, until now, have not been studied in the literature. 
Regarding the influence of state-ownership, we find that minority state-owned firms are more 
likely to become recipients than majority state-owned and private-owned firms. Provincial 
1 China’s 9th and 10th “Science and Technology Development Plan” specify target ratios of 1.5% for gross R&D 
expenditures to GDP in 2000 and 2005 but actual ratios reached were 0.90% and 1.35%. 
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variation in China’s transition towards a market-driven economy reveals that R&D subsidies 
are less often distributed by more market-oriented provincial governments and that China’s 
innovation policy of “picking the winners” is more supportive of firms located in developed 
provinces. 
Considering effectiveness, we find that R&D subsidies instantaneously crowd-out firms’ 
own R&D investment but are neutral in later periods. For example, in 2006 one public RMB 
reduces firms’ own R&D investments by half a RMB. This implies that public subsidies fail 
to correct industrial R&D towards the social optimum but cause partial crowding-out instead. 
For repeated recipients, high-tech firms, and minority state-owned firms we identify 
instantaneous neutral effects. Nonetheless, the overall economic justification for China’s 
R&D programs throughout the time period 2001 to 2006 is questionable since we fail to 
identify additionality effects. Against this background, we acknowledge that the “Medium- to 
Long-term Plan for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020)” has provided 
considerable changes to China’s innovation policy and future research should examine 
whether the effectiveness of R&D subsidies has improved after 2006. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the rational 
for R&D subsidies and review prior studies. Against China’s institutional background, 
implications for the allocation and effectiveness of R&D subsidies are derived. In Section 3 
we explain the econometric methodology employed. Section 4 introduces the data and 
provides descriptive statistics. Section 5 contains the main results, robustness tests, and 
further investigations. We provide concluding remarks in the final section.  
2 Previous Literature 
The seminal argument for R&D subsidies has been provided by Arrow (1962). Due to 
market failure in the production of knowledge, R&D investments of firms may remain below 
the social optimum and require correction by public subsidies. The crucial question is whether 
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the government is able to select those R&D projects with high social returns which firms 
would not fund by themselves. R&D subsidies encompass two main policy instruments, tax 
incentives and direct subsidies (David et al. 2000). The primary difference is that the former 
allow for firm selection of R&D projects, whereas the latter typically are accompanied by 
government selection.  
In our study we are concerned with the effect of direct R&D subsidies on firms’ own 
R&D investments. In contrast to firms’ gross R&D investments, own R&D investments 
correspond with net R&D investments which remain once firms’ gross R&D investments 
have been corrected for R&D subsidies received. Figure 1 presents the taxonomy of subsidy 
effects – ranging from crowding-out over neutrality to additionality. In the situation of 
additionality, grants are complementary to own funds and increase net R&D expenditures. 
This outcome might be caused by several mechanisms: (1) R&D programs require the 
recipient to match public funds with own funds, (2) a subsidized project involves setting up of 
research facilities, lowers fix costs of other current or future projects, and thus turns those into 
profitable investments and (3) expertise gained throughout a subsidized project might 
positively influence the profitability of non-subsidized projects.  
Full crowding-out occurs when public funds are perfect substitutes to own funds and 
decrease net R&D expenditures. In this case, matching requirements fail to prevent 
substitution of own funds by public funds because it is unknown to the government whether 
the selected project would have been undertaken without support. Even if a firm had not 
initiated a project without public support the recipient may readjust its portfolio of projects 
and allocate funds from dispensable projects towards the supported one. Funds released by 
subsidies might be used partially or totally for new R&D projects but could also be expensed 
for non-R&D purposes. Consequentially, subsidies may also result in partial crowding-out or 
neutrality. 
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Using firm level instead of project data blurs insights into the rearrangements of project 
portfolios and thus limits the identification of the precise mechanism through which the firm 
changes its net R&D expenditures (Lach 2002). Nonetheless, we can make inference about 
changes in net R&D spending of recipients, which is essential information for policy makers. 
If the direct effect of government grants on firms’ own R&D investment is negative or not 
significant, then the economic justification for continuing the support of industrial R&D in its 
existent form is considerably undermined. 
2.1 Prior Studies 
A steadily growing literature has empirically examined the effects of R&D subsidies and 
provides conflicting evidence. David et al. (2000) report that one-third of those studies 
conducted before 2000 fail to reject crowding out. Similarly, Zuniga-Vicente et al. (2014) 
report that one-fifth of more recent firm level studies fail to reject crowding out, while 17% 
report neutrality and the remaining 63% find evidence for additionality. In summary, this 
points to context specific effects of R&D subsidies, depending on the country and time 
period. 
More recently, the literature has started to consider temporal aspects of R&D subsidies 
and confirms persistence in grant distribution (Bloch & Graversen 2008, Gonzales & Pazo 
2008). Persistence might arise due of various reasons: (1) because prior recipients might 
benefit from information advantages in subsequent applications, these firms not only select 
themselves more often into the application process but also exhibit higher probabilities of 
filing successful applications, (2) governments may repeatedly select prior recipients to 
maximize the success rate of a policy, and (3) persistence might be increased by R&D 
projects which span multiple time periods. However, investigations of the effectiveness of 
prior subsidies on R&D expenditures are still scarce. For German manufacturing firms, 
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Hussinger (2008) confirms additionality and Aschhof (2009) finds additionality for frequent 
recipients but neutrality for first-time receivers.  
There might be several reasons why a grant shows no instantaneous but a lagged effect on 
R&D investments: (1) the adjustment of a firm’s R&D portfolio might be time consuming so 
that the full effect only emerges with delay, (2) a subsidized project may lower the fix costs of 
future projects, and thus turns those into profitable investments, and (3) learning throughout a 
subsidized project might increase the success of upcoming R&D projects. However, for 
lagged effects the prior evidence remains inconclusive. Investigating Israeli manufacturing 
firms, Lach (2002) finds an instantaneous crowding-out effect and a lagged neutrality effect. 
For Norwegian high-tech industries, Klette & Moen (2012) find both, weak evidence for 
lagged additionality as well as lagged neutral effects, depending on the econometric 
specification.  
Notwithstanding that R&D programs are not exclusively employed in developed 
countries, the limited number of studies for emerging countries presents equally inconclusive 
evidence (for examples see Kwon & Ko 2004 and Lee & Cin 2010 for Korea and Özcelik & 
Taymaz 2008 for Turkey). In the following, we review the evidence derived from Chinese 
firm-level data, including studies published by Chinese language journals. 2 Because we take 
interest in reactions at the firm level, we exclude studies at the industry level and disregard 
firm level studies which employ industry level subsidy data. Finally, our review includes ten 
studies concerned with China, seven in Chinese language and three in English language, as 
summarized in Table 1.  
We briefly report the main insights of our survey. Surprisingly, only one out of ten studies 
fails to reject crowding-out in China which is in stark difference to those surveys 
summarizing research conducted in developed countries. In comparison with one-third of the 
2 The heterogeneous quality of the Chinese literature has convinced us to focus on studies which are published in 
journals listed in the Peking University Ranking of Chinese Core Journals. 
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earlier studies surveyed in David et al. (2000) and one-fifth of the more recent literature 
explored in Zuniga-Vicente et al. (2014), one-tenth is an unexpectedly low ratio for China’s 
R&D subsidies. Our skepticism is shared by Naughton (2007, p. 368), who rejects overly 
positive results of China’s innovation policy as counterintuitive. In addition, Hu & Jefferson 
(2008) are skeptical that the abrupt increase in industrial R&D observable throughout the 
early 2000s has been driven by government funding and Guan & Yam (2014) show that direct 
subsidies have failed to enhance innovative economic performance of firms in Beijing 
throughout the 1990s. Tian & Yu (2012) point out that the government or scientific 
community might influence Chinese journals to select politically satisfactory evidence for 
publication. Although we cannot observe ex ante selection, for those studies in our review, 
methodological issues, not the journal’s language, seem to be decisive.  
As criticized by David et al. (2000), many studies ignore endogeneity problems by 
assuming random selection in grant distribution. However, this assumption is assuredly 
rejected for the selective support of inventive high-tech firms pursued by China’s R&D 
programs. Firstly, these firms are likely to have higher R&D spending than other firms and, 
secondly, confounding characteristics which affect R&D spending may affect grant 
distribution as well. Thus, receiving a grant becomes endogenous to the firm’s own R&D 
efforts. In other words, even in the hypothetical absence of government grants the R&D 
expenditures of recipients are likely to be higher than those of non-recipients, leading to an 
overestimation of the actual subsidy effect.  
Considering the estimators recommended by Blundell & Costa-Dias (2000) for policy 
evaluation in non-experimental settings, only the studies by Guo et al. (2014), Xie et al. 
(2009), and Cheng & Chen (2006) employ appropriate econometric strategies to address 
selection bias. To save space, we disregard studies with an obvious risk for selection bias 
from the subsequent discussion. Guo et al. (2014) conduct a single program evaluation for 
China’s “Innovation Fund”. However, their findings are only of marginal interest to us 
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because they neither report if the fund’s official selection criteria are empirically confirmed 
nor do they examine the effect on innovation inputs but on outputs. Xie et al. (2009) find a 
positive and significant effect of subsidies on R&D but remain unclear whether R&D 
investment is measured in net or gross expenditures. Because their study employs a binary 
operationalization of R&D, the resulting specification allows for the conclusion that recipients 
have a higher likelihood of conducting R&D but is limited towards more nuanced 
interpretations. Cheng & Chen (2006) examine the effect of R&D subsidies on own R&D 
investments and find neutrality for the average recipient. However, their study is restricted to 
private firms located in Zhejiang province which imposes limitations to the generalizability of 
their findings for China’s innovation policy.  
Thus, our review shows that prior studies fail to provide conclusive evidence for the 
allocation and effectiveness of China’s R&D subsidies. We aim to fill this gap. Against 
China’s institutional background of an emerging and transitional economy, in the following 
section, we derive implications which are addressed in the subsequent analysis.  
2.2 China’s R&D Subsidies and Institutional Background 
For the time period 2001 to 2006, China’s innovation policy emphasizes economic 
development through innovation, high technology, and industrial R&D (Liu et al. 2011). The 
Ministry of Science & Technology (MOST) administers China’s major R&D programs, e.g. 
the Key Technologies Program or the National High Technologies Program. Grant allocation 
takes place through an ostensibly competitive proposal process and R&D activities that 
address the policy targets of the central government are preferentially selected (Ding et al. 
2008). In addition to MOST, other central agencies as well as subnational governments are 
involved in grant allocation. However, these actors might display different bureaucratic 
preferences with respect to the selection of recipients. Further, essential technological 
expertise required for selection and monitoring of R&D programs may vary between actors 
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(Springut et al. 2011). Because of China’s distinctive reforms, provincial governments have 
emerged as powerful regulators of firms in their jurisdictions (Tenev et al. 2002). Half of 
China’s spending for science and technology, including R&D programs, takes place at the 
subnational level – emphasizing the importance of provincial governments in innovation 
policy (Springut et al. 2011). Therefore, de facto implementation of China’s R&D programs 
might deviate from the blueprints of the central government.  
On the grounds of Arrow’s (1962) seminal argument advocating a correction of R&D 
investments by public subsidies, the government takes the role of a regulator with the 
ambition to reduce market failure in the production of knowledge by private firms. Against 
the background of China’s transition from a centrally planned to a mixed market economy, 
the government not only takes the regulator’s role for private-owned firms but also acts as a 
majority or minority shareholder within China’s numerous state-owned firms.  
During China’s planned economy, the government directly commanded state-owned 
firms with little need for supplementary employment of R&D subsidies (Holz 2003, p. 270). 
However, referring to the ongoing separation of regulation, ownership, and management 
within China’s state-owned firms, Lee and Hahn (2004) point to the rise of principal-agent 
and corporate governance issues. While the process of separation may, on the one hand, 
increase the government’s willingness to employ R&D subsidies within the state sector, on 
the other hand, it might limit monitoring mechanisms and give rise to the abuse of public 
funds for non-R&D purposes (Ding 2000).  
Meanwhile, many former majority state-owned firms have been transformed into minority 
state-owned firms with managers becoming owners, e.g. major shareholders. This 
transformation also corresponds with a reduction of direct governmental influence on firms 
but, unlike within majority state-owned firms, introduces managers as additional owners that 
are concerned with the long-term competitiveness of their firms (Tenev et al. 2002). 
Therefore, the transformation into a minority state-owned firm may increase the government’s 
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need to employ R&D subsidies in order to supplement its diminishing potential of direct 
command. In addition, the corporate governance setting within minority state-owned firms 
appears to be beneficial for an effective use of R&D subsidies since major shareholders share 
the government’s ambition to raise firms’ R&D investments.  
With respect to the increasing number of private-owned firms operating in China’s 
economy, the government’s function is by and large reduced to regulatory issues while 
mechanisms of direct command remain formally restricted to the state sector. In contrast to 
the state sector, the private sector is determined by fierce competition as well as hard budget 
constraints and private firms often pursue short-term profit maximization at the expense of 
uncertain R&D investments with high capital lockup (Naughton 2007, p. 309). Against this 
background, the private sector’s potential in increasing China’s industrial R&D investments 
appears ambivalent and these firms’ commitment to policy targets is low. Although private-
owned firm may be in greater need of financial support the actual utilization of funds within 
these firms remains uncertain – decreasing their attractiveness as recipients from the 
regulator’s perspective. Reversely, private-owned firms might also refrain from participation 
in public R&D programs because they like to avoid government interference in their business 
operations. In summary, China’s economic setting offers the unique opportunity to study how 
allocation and effectiveness of R&D subsidies are influenced by firm ownership and related 
command mechanisms. 
Progress in the transition from plan to market is not taking place uniformly but exhibits 
a pattern of provincial variation across China (Fang et al. 2007). Provincial governments 
follow different economic strategies as observable in varying degrees of governmental 
resource allocation in proportion to provincial GDPs. However, it remains unclear how 
increasing market-orientation might affect the distribution of grants. Since more market-
oriented provincial governments are confronted with a higher probability of market failure 
within their jurisdiction, this may require correction through frequent employment of R&D 
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subsidies. Reversely, more market-oriented governments might employ grants precisely less 
often in order to limit incidences of economic intervention. This pattern of provincial 
variation in China’s ongoing economic transition allows us to study if marketization is 
accompanied by a more or less frequent employment of R&D subsidies to address potential 
market failure in the production of knowledge.  
Marketization and economic development are related but not identical concepts. With 
respect to China’s regional economic disparities, Xu (2011) argues that policies of the central 
government in general favor the support of China’s developed coastal regions. Indeed, firms 
located in developed regions may more easily access crucial resources required for successful 
R&D operations, which makes them more promising recipients than firms found in China’s 
backward regions. In conclusion, beyond the focus on inventive high-tech firms specified in 
the central government’s policy blueprints, firm ownership, differences in economic strategies 
of provincial governments, and regional economic disparities might influence the allocation 
and effectiveness of R&D subsidies in China. 
3 Econometric Method 
The crucial problem in evaluation studies is that grant distribution is mostly not random, 
but the government may select recipients according to political priorities and certain types of 
firms might self-select into the application process. To avoid selection bias, the evaluation 
literature presents a variety of methods, such as instrumental variables techniques, selection 
models, PSM, or DID (for surveys see Blundell & Costa-Dias 2000, Cerulli 2010, and 
Heckman et al. 1999). We follow the suggestion of Blundell and Costa-Dias (2000) who 
argue that a combination of non-parametric PSM with a DID estimator is likely to provide 
robust results. Indeed, the properties are complementary, because the first relaxes the 
common trend assumption of the latter, while the DID estimator accounts for time-invariant 
unobservable firm heterogeneity which is neglected by PSM. With respect to the evaluation of 
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R&D subsidies, this econometric strategy has been applied by Goerg et al. (2008) and Goerg 
& Strobl (2007) for panel data and by Aerts & Schmidt (2008) for repeated cross-sections.   
The average treatment effect on the treated can be expressed as: 
𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇�𝑆𝑆 = 1) − 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶�𝑆𝑆 = 1�                                                                            (1) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇  and  𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶  denote the outcome variables, in our case R&D expenditures, in the 
treated ‘T’ and counterfactual ‘C’ situation. The treatment status, in other words the receipt or 
non-receipt of R&D subsidies, is indicated by 𝑆𝑆 ∈ {0,1} . Thus 𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is calculated as the 
difference of the actual outcome in the case of treatment with the potential outcome in the 
counterfactual situation.  
While the actual outcome 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇�𝑆𝑆 = 1) can be calculated by the sample mean of the 
outcome in the treatment group, the counterfactual situation 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶�𝑆𝑆 = 1� is not observed in 
the data. Naïvely assuming that the average outcome of the counterfactual situation equals the 
average outcome of the non-treated group: 
𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
𝐶𝐶�𝑆𝑆 = 1� = 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶�𝑆𝑆 = 0�                                                                                        (2) 
might lead to selection bias if the allocation of treatment is non-random. In our setting, 
China’s “picking-the-winner” innovation policy aims to selectively support inventive and 
high-tech firms which might have higher R&D expenditures than non-inventors or non-high-
tech firms. 3  Therefore, the confounding variables which affect the distribution of R&D 
subsidies also affect the firm’s R&D expenditures and thus receiving a treatment becomes 
endogenous to the firm’s R&D. Consequently, even in the hypothetical absence of treatment 
the R&D expenditures of treated firms are likely to be higher than those of non-treated firms, 
leading to an overestimation of the actual treatment effect.  
3 Indeed, the R&D intensity of inventive and high-tech firms in our sample is more than two times higher than 
the R&D intensity of non-inventive and non-high-tech firms. 
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3.1 Propensity Score Matching 
PSM is a non-parametric estimator which requires no particular functional form. It 
matches treated and non-treated observations with similar confounders and thereby identifies 
a non-treated control group with the same likelihood of being treated as the actually treated 
group. Because the only remaining difference between both groups is the treatment, the 
difference in outcomes finally can be attributed to the treatment. However, PSM relies on 
relatively strong assumptions and is data-demanding with regard to the operationalization of 
relevant confounding variables. 
First and most generally, the stable-unit-treatment-value assumption (SUTVA) is satisfied 
if the outcome takes a single value, instead of following a distribution, and if the treatment of 
one firm does not affect the treatment effect on another firm (Rubin 1990). Secondly, the 
conditional independence assumption (CIA) needs to be invoked which states that the receipt 
of treatment 𝑆𝑆 and potential outcomes is independent (∐) for those firms with the same set of 
characteristics 𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥 (Rubin 1977): 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇 ,𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 ∐  𝑆𝑆|𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥.                       (3) 
The CIA is only satisfied if all confounding variables are known and observable in the 
data. Unfortunately, the validity of SUTVA and CIA cannot be tested. However, based on the 
rich data observable to us we argue that enough information is given for the operationalization 
of confounders. Thirdly, the common support condition (CSC) demands that for all treated 
observations, a control-observation should be found in the sub-population of non-treated 
observations. In other words, it rules out that the treatment is perfectly predictable (0,1) based 
on the observables 𝑋𝑋 and ensures that firms with the same characteristics 𝑋𝑋 have a positive 
probability of receiving or not receiving the treatment (Heckman et al. 1999): 
0 < 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆|𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥) < 1.                                         (4) 
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The CSC requires that there are no regions where either treated or control observations 
have zero probability to occur (for example if firms with a specific attribute included in 𝑋𝑋 are 
strictly excluded from participation in R&D programs). In addition, we can fulfill the CSC by 
removing observations on treated firms with probabilities larger than the maximum and 
smaller than the minimum probabilities of those observations in the potential control group. 
Consequently, the average treatment effect on the treated could be estimated as: 
𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇�𝑆𝑆 = 1,𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥) − 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶�𝑆𝑆 = 0,𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥�.                                                    (5) 
The PSM estimator specifically addresses the issue of the CSC. Matching treated and non-
treated observations might become complicated due to different dimensions or weighting 
schemes which may be applied for different firm characteristics in 𝑋𝑋. Fortunately, Rosenbaum 
& Rubin (1983) show that if CIA is satisfied, then not only two treatments are independent of 
the assignment conditional on X but also on specific functions of X, denoted as the propensity 
score 𝑃𝑃�(𝑋𝑋). Thus, the so-called ‘curse of dimensionality’ can be overcome by the use of 
propensity scores generated from modeling the probability of receiving a treatment.  
The accuracy of matching can be improved by conditioning on a subset of 𝑋𝑋, also known 
as imposing stratification criteria, as done in our study. We perform nearest neighbor 
matching with replacement and allow the same control observations to be matched to 
different treated observations. This replacement offers a large pool of potential controls but 
also causes a bias in the t-statistic on mean differences which is corrected for according to 
Lechner (2001). Our matching technique follows the routine by Czarnitzki & Lopes-Bento 
(2013) – for further details see the Matching Protocol in the Appendix. Finally, after 
performing PSM we can estimate the average treatment effect on the treated:  
𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇�𝑆𝑆 = 1,𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥)) − 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶�𝑆𝑆 = 0,𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥)�.        (6) 
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3.2 Difference-in-Differences Estimator 
As argued in Blundell and Costa-Dias (2000), the PSM estimator still crucially rests on the 
CIA. Despite comprehensive data, it still seems unreasonable to believe that we can observe 
all firm characteristics which determine the distribution of R&D subsidies and R&D 
expenditures. The CIA between the error term in the outcome equation and the treatment is 
quite strong if one considers that firms might select themselves according to their forecasted 
outcome. Consequently, we combine PSM with a DID estimator and are thus able to control 
for time-constant firm-specific effects in the unobservables.  
Nonetheless, Goerg & Strobl (2008) point out that the DID estimator might become 
inconsistent if firms apply for a R&D subsidy and also increase their R&D expenditures 
regardless of the treatment. If this phenomenon is symmetrically distributed between 
recipients and non-recipients, then this issue should not be of concern. If, however, this is 
more common for recipients, then the subsidy effect is likely to be overestimated because the 
increase in R&D expenditures is not fully caused by the treatment. Even though this issue 
cannot be completely ruled out, we argue that our data is sufficiently rich so that no additional 
time-variant unobservables that may be correlated with the treatment and the outcome.  
The DID requires panel data and compares the change in the outcome for treated 
observations with the change in the outcome of the counterfactual observations according 
to∆𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 − ∆𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 , where ∆  is a time-differencing operator over 𝑡𝑡0  to 𝑡𝑡1 . The DID outcome 
equation can also be expressed as ∆𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽∆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, while the average treatment effect 
on the treated is estimated as follows: 
𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖1𝑇𝑇 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖0𝑇𝑇 �𝑆𝑆 = 1� − 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖0𝐶𝐶 �𝑆𝑆 = 0�.         (7) 
Finally, we combine the advantages of the PSM estimator with the advantages of the DID 
estimator. Thereby, we ensure that the treatment group and the control group are chosen 
according to observable confounders 𝑋𝑋, while common macroeconomic trends and constant 
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firm-specific unobserved effects are controlled for as well. We estimate the average treatment 
effect on the treated according to our final specification: 
𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖1𝑇𝑇 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖0𝑇𝑇 �𝑆𝑆 = 1,𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥)� − 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖0𝐶𝐶 �𝑆𝑆 = 0,𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥)�.       (8) 
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1 Data 
Our raw data includes the population of firms listed at the two stock exchanges in 
mainland China throughout the time period 2001 to 2006.4 Until the mid-2000s, the central 
government determined stock issuance quotas to maintain a balance between regions at 
China’s stock market (Pistor & Xu 2005). Provinces with sound economic performance 
obtained more quotas and provincial governments selected firms for initial public offerings 
(Du & Xu 2009). The resulting composition is an adequate reflection of the China’s economic 
development, with emphasis on better performing firms. Manufacturing firms from coastal 
provinces contribute the majority while remaining industries and provinces are included to a 
lesser extent. See Map 1 for an overview of firm locations. 
Long et al. (1999) have suggested that the information efficiency of China’s stock markets 
had reached a reasonable degree before the early 2000s.5 In line with the enforcement of 
stricter governance requirements the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission obligates the 
disclosure of subsidies since 2001 (Jing 2009). 6  China’s Accounting Standards define 
subsidies as monetary or non-monetary assets obtained by a firm from the government, 
4 Only “domestic” firms are listed on the stock exchanges of Shanghai and Shenzhen. According to the definition 
of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (2006; 2002) a firm is considered “domestic” if the percentage 
of total shares held by foreign parties does not exceed 20%. 
5 Data on Chinese listed firms has been widely used in high-quality publications (for examples see Fisman & 
Wang 2010, Kato & Long 2006, and Fernald & Rogers 2002). 
6 China Securities Regulatory Commission (2000): “Regulation no. 2 disclosure guideline for the content and 
format of the annual report for the public offering of companies”. 
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excluding capital investments undertaken by the government as a partial owner of the firm.7 
Until the end of 2006, subsidies have been reported as an independent item in the income 
statement with additional information regarding the type of subsidies in the supplementary 
report of the financial statements (Lee et al. 2014). 8 Information on subsidies is obtained 
from the Chinese RESSET database. In our study, we discriminate between R&D and non-
R&D subsidies but disregard tax refunds since we are concerned with the effect of direct 
subsidies. 
PATSTAT 9  is our source of patent data. We exclusively consider applications for 
invention patents to identify technological inventions and simultaneously avoid double 
counting of Chinese invention patents and utility/design patents. In the context of this study, 
applications are preferable to patent grants because applications are closer to the time of 
invention. The matching of accounting information to patent portfolios is based on the firm 
name and accounts for historic names. Firm patent matches are performed in a semi-manual 
approach to take care of spelling errors, systematical abbreviations, and names written in 
Chinese characters, Pinyin, or English wording. Based on all possible name variations, a 
computer algorithm is used to match firm and patent data, followed by manual checks to 
assure the correctness of the matching process. We base our measures on patent families 
instead of patent applications since the number of families more closely corresponds to the 
number of inventions while applications for the same invention may be filed in more than one 
jurisdiction and thus become an inflated measure. Patent families are compiled following the 
definition of the International Patent Documentation Center.  
7 China Accounting Standard Committee (2006): “Accounting standards no. 16 – government subsidies”. 
8 The China Accounting Standard Committee (2006) regulation “Accounting standards no. 16 – government 
subsidies” is enforced in 2007 and implies amendments in the accounting regulations for subsidies. Before 2007, 
financial statements include a single account for subsidy income as well as mandatory notes on the different 
types of subsidies received. According to the new regulation, subsidy income is included in the non-operating 
income and the available information on different types of subsidies is considerably reduced.   
9 April 2013 version of the EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database PATSTAT. 
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Because patent citations are not disclosed by China’s State Intellectual Property Office, 
we rely on a novel approach. Specifically, we calculate citations on the family level by 
counting forward citations received within the first three years after the publication of the 
priority application filed via the Patent Cooperation Treaty at the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO). Thus, the three year time window in which citations are accounted for 
opens 18 month after the priority date when the patented invention becomes observable to 
third parties and thus may receive citations. An additional advantage of this approach is that 
we avoid a national citation bias. Because forward citations are often received from patentees 
located in the same national jurisdiction as the applicant of the cited patent, by exclusively 
counting forward citations received from applications filed via WIPO we rule out the bias 
resulting from filings at national patent offices.  
For the classification of high-tech industries we follow the definition by China’s NBS.10 
Export data at the harmonized system 6-digit level is obtained from Chinese Customs and 
matched to the firm by also taking historic firm names into account. For the subsequent 
identification of high-tech exports, we exclude processing trade and filter the data based on 
the classification of China’s High and New Technology Export Products Catalogues (issued 
by the Ministries of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, MOST, MOF, the State 
Administration of Taxation and the General Administration of Customs in 2000, 2003, and 
2006).  
Since the majority of listed firms are former state-owned firms, annual information about 
the share held by the government informs us about the state of firm privatization. The 
respective ownership data is obtained from RESSET. To observe heterogeneity in provincial 
10 The high-tech definition of China’s NBS includes the following industries: electronic component 
manufacturing, other electronic equipment manufacturing, medical device manufacturing, aerospace vehicle 
manufacturing, electrical machinery and equipment manufacturing, measuring instruments and office machinery, 
pharmaceutical manufacturing, communication and related equipment manufacturing, computers and related 
equipment manufacturing.  
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transition towards marketization, we borrow the index for government allocation of resources 
in provincial GDP provided by China’s National Economic Research Institute (NERI) (for 
details see Fan et al. 2007). To measure regional economic disparities in China’s 
development, we observe GDP per capita on the provincial level. The source of this data is 
China’s NBS. 
Fundamental balance sheet data is obtained from the global database COMPUSTAT, and 
the Chinese databases WIND and GTA CSMAR. Information on R&D expenditures is hand-
collected from the universe of annual reports accessible via the Chinese CNINFO database. 
We screen all documents for an exhaustive set of R&D-related key words and interpolate 
missing observations for those firms with prior R&D expenditures. 11 Note that monetary 
values are deflated and expressed in RMB. 
Initially, our raw data includes information on 1,458 firms and 7,853 observations. We 
exclude 11 firms with a holding structure and 12 firms from the financial sector. Hereafter, 
we first eliminate measurement errors and missing values and then exclude outliers above the 
99th percentile for our R&D outcome variables. We remain a sample with 1,331 firms and 
7,008 observations. As required by our estimation strategy, we calculate first-differences for 
the outcome and treatment variables and lag treatment variables by two time periods in order 
to be able to estimate lagged effects of R&D subsidies for up to two time periods. After again 
eliminating observations with missing values, our estimation sample includes 1,155 firms 
with 4,139 observations. 
Notably, we are aware of concerns regarding the quality of Chinese data in general and of 
subsidy data in particular (Haley & Haley 2013). Since the firm-level data used in this study 
leaves fewer room for data fabrication than aggregated data and the financial statements of 
11 It should be noted that China’s measure of R&D is more broadly defined than the typical R&D measure used 
by the OECD and most of the R&D literature (Jefferson et al. 2003). The broader concept applies to both, R&D 
subsidies and R&D expenditures and, in addition to R&D expenditures, involves a range of science- and 
technology-related expenses. In the remainder of this study, we continue to refer to R&D. 
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listed firms are scrutinized by accounting agencies, we are less concerned regarding data 
quality (Orlik 2011). In addition, we test the quality of subsidy information based on the ad 
valorem distribution of China’s export subsidies. For exporting firms, we regress export 
subsidies on total exports and a set of controls and find that firms’ export volume is positive 
and highly significant (p-value < 0.001) in explaining the amount of export subsidies 
received. 12  This result confirms the expected relationship between export subsidies and 
exports volume and thus leaves us with no particular reason for skepticism with respect to 
data quality. 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Following the objectives of China’s innovation policy, we consider firm inventiveness and 
high-tech orientation as important determinants for grant distribution. In addition to standard 
firm characteristics, we operationalize a set of confounding variables to control for 
heterogeneity in ownership, resource allocation by provincial governments, as well as 
regional economic disparities. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics.  
Subsidies are conceptualized as binary variables to meet our methodological requirements. 
R&D subsidies are distributed to 10% of observations. Acknowledging persistence in the 
allocation of subsidies, we control if a firm had received R&D subsidies or other subsidies 
within that last 2 years prior to the treatment. R&D subsidies had previously been distributed 
to 11% of observations while 44% of observations have received non-R&D subsidies 
throughout the last 2 years. These statistics suggest that R&D subsidies are allocated less 
often than non-R&D subsidies received by firms. 
12 We regress the log of export subsidies on the lagged log of export volume, log of the number of employees, 
capital intensity, profitability, log of age, and include controls for year, industry, and provincial GDP per capita. 
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A firm is identified as an inventor if it has a positive patent stock.13 This might appear as a 
low benchmark but sufficiently discriminates between Chinese inventors and non-inventors 
for the time period 2001 to 2006. 607 out of 1,331 firms are classified as inventors while the 
mean value of their weighted patent stock is 0.007. Because, firstly, the distribution of the 
economic value of patents is generally  highly skewed (Harhoff et al. 2003) and, secondly, the 
last decade has witnessed a flood of low value patent applications originating from China (Lei 
et al. 2012), we separately control for the quality of inventions by calculating the mean of 
forward citations received per patent family. The average patent family of patenting firms 
receives 0.038 forward citations. 
The general high-tech orientation of a firm is operationalized based on the industrial high-
tech classification. In our sample, 16% of observations belong to high-tech industries. 
However, we expect considerable heterogeneity between the actual high-tech orientations of 
these firms. Therefore, we calculate the high-tech export intensity as non-processing high-
tech exports weighted by the firm’s revenue. Processing export is excluded because Chinese 
firms often only assemble imported high-tech inputs for overseas export markets but add little 
value to the final product (Wang & Wei 2010). The average high-tech export intensity for 
exporting firms is 4% 
Based on ownership shares held by the government, we discriminate between majority 
state-owned firms (𝑥𝑥 > 50%), minority state-owned firms (50% ≥ 𝑥𝑥 > 0%), and private-
owned firms (𝑥𝑥 = 0%). 33% of the observations are majority state-owned firms, while 39% 
are minority SOEs, and 29% are Private-owned firms.14  
13 Precisely, the patent stock in year t is the patent filings of that year plus the patent stock in year t-1 depreciated 
by 15%. To control for firm size, we weigh the patent stock by the number of employees. 
14 For each ownership type we calculate the share of treated observations and find that majority state-owned 
firms exhibit half the probability of receiving R&D subsidies compared to minority state-owned firms and 
private-owned firms. We interpret this finding as preliminary evidence for our consideration that the 
government’s direct influence on majority state-owned firms decreases the need for additional intervention by 
R&D subsidies. 
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Heterogeneity in provincial transition towards a market-driven economy is measured by 
the NERI index based on the resource allocation by provincial governments in proportion to 
provincial GDPs. For the base year 2001, the NERI index is normalized on a scale ranging 
from 1 to 10, with 10 indicating the province with the highest level of resource allocation by 
the market and 1 indicating the province with the highest level of resource allocation by the 
government. The remaining 29 provinces receive scores in between, according to their 
relative performances. In subsequent years the index may take values outside the base scale to 
account for differences between provinces and over time. Observations in our sample have a 
mean index of 7.93, suggesting that the majority of firms are located in provinces 
administered by more market-oriented governments. China’s regional variation in economic 
development is measured by the log of provincial GDP per capita.15 
We briefly summarize the operationalization of standard controls. Firm size is measured 
by the log of the number of employees while the capital intensity is measured by taking the 
log of net fixed assets divided by the number of employees. Profitability is a binary variable 
taking the value of 1 if the firm’s net profits are positive. We classify a firm as an exporter if 
it exhibits exports in the respective year. The log of the number of years since establishment 
informs us about the age. In addition, we use 21 industry dummies to control for industry-
specific characteristics. Because 62% of firms operate in manufacturing, we use a set of finer 
industry controls for the manufacturing sector. Table 3 shows the industry composition and 
the number of subsidized firms per industry. 
Our main output variable is R&D intensity. We operationalize R&D intensity based on 
gross and net R&D expenditures weighted by revenue. For R&D performers the gross and net 
R&D intensity is 0.75% and 0.73% respectively, which is similar to the average gross R&D 
intensity of 0.76% for China’s large- and medium-sized throughout this time period (NBS & 
15 Note that the market orientation of provincial governments and provincial economic development are 
interacting but different concepts as confirmed by the low correlation coefficient of 0.266. 
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MOST 2007). For later robustness tests, we also calculate the R&D stock according to the 
perpetual investment method.16 The mean value for the R&D stock weighted by the capital 
stock is 6.64%.17  
Employing a Probit model with standard errors clustered at the firm level, we regress the 
decision to conduct R&D on our main confounders and standard firm characteristics. Indeed, 
we find that inventors and firm in high-tech sectors have a positive and highly significant (p < 
0.001) probability to conduct R&D. 
5 Empirical Results 
5.1 Allocation 
In Table 4, we present four Probit estimations for the likelihood of receiving R&D 
subsidies. All time-varying firm level regressors, except age which we consider as truly 
exogenous, are lagged by one time period to avoid simultaneity between (anticipated) grants 
and changes in firm characteristics. All provincial level regressors are included without lags 
since these are exogenous to the firm. Pairwise correlation between all regressors is around 
0.4 or lower and standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  
Model (1) presents a parsimonious specification without controls for prior subsidies and 
industry affiliation. Beginning with firm inventiveness, we find that the patent stock is 
negative but insignificant while the patent citation intensity is positive and significant at the 
1% level. For high-tech industry affiliation, we find a positive effect at the 5% significance 
level while the high-tech export intensity is negative and insignificant. These finding suggest 
16 For the time period 2001-2011, we observe an average growth rate of 25% for R&D expenditures which is 
similar to Liu (2009) who find a growth rate of 22% for the time period 1999-2009. We use our growth rate to 
calculate the R&D stock in the first year and apply the standard depreciation rate of 15% to account for the fact 
that knowledge becomes obsolete. 
17 In comparison to the patent stock it becomes obvious that not all patenting firms also conduct R&D. However, 
non-R&D invention is not unusual in developing countries and also exists in developed countries (Rammer et al. 
2012). 
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that it is not the quantity but the quality of inventions determines selection and that affiliation 
with the high-tech sector instead of the intensity of high-tech exports is relevant.  
For ownership, we find that both minority state-owned firms and Private-owned firms 
have a significantly, at the 1% level, higher probability of receiving grants compared to 
majority state-owned firms. Firms located in jurisdictions of provincial governments which 
are more market-oriented have a significantly lower probability of receiving grants. 
Conversely, firms located in more developed provinces have higher probabilities of receiving 
grants, both at the 1% significance level. For the set of standard controls, we find that 
profitability, export status, and age are positive and significantly correlated with receiving 
R&D subsidies. These findings fit well into China’s innovation policy of “picking the 
winners”. 
In Model (2), we include industry controls.18 The results remain largely unchanged except 
that high-tech industry affiliation and export status turn insignificant. These changes are 
plausible, since both of these criteria are largely explained by industry characteristics which 
are now controlled for.  
Model (3) presents our final specification and includes additional information on prior 
R&D subsidies and prior non-R&D subsidies. We confirm persistence in grant distribution for 
both subsidy categories at the 1% significance level. Note that the inclusion of prior subsidies 
increases the models’ goodness of the fit (pseudo R2) from 0.08 in Model (2) to 0.28 in 
Model (3). Since prior subsidies capture information about firm characteristics which have 
previously led to successful applications, the explanatory power of remaining regressors is 
reduced. This reduction also applies to industry controls, as revealed by an increase in the p-
value of the chi2-test from 0.12 in Model (2) to 0.57 in Model (3).  
18 Note that by including industry controls we lose 53 observations from mining and 12 observations from wood 
& furniture manufacturing since these industries have zero probability of receiving R&D subsidies in our 
regression sample.  
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In addition to prior subsidies, the following characteristics remain significant with respect 
to the probability of receiving R&D subsidies: patent citation intensity, minority state 
ownership, resource allocation by provincial governments, and provincial economic 
development. For these regressors we calculate average marginal effects as a change from 0 to 
1 for discretely distributed variables and as an increase of one standard deviation from the 
mean for continuously distributed variables. Against an average probability of 11.67% to 
become a recipient, we calculate corresponding changes in percentage points: prior R&D 
36.44, prior non-R&D subsidies 5.04, patent citations intensity 10.40, minority state-
ownership 3.36, market orientation by provincial government -3.98, and provincial GDP per 
capita 2.87. 
In line with the literature, we confirm persistence in receiving R&D subsidies. In addition, 
our findings suggest that grants are indeed distributed to firms with previous high quality 
inventions. Further, minority state-owned firms are more likely to become recipients. As 
discussed before, a large share of China’s spending for science and technology is allocated by 
subnational governments which often hold shares in minority state-owned firms whereas 
majority state-owned firms are commonly associated with the central government. Minority 
state-owned firms may be frequent recipients because of the government’s lesser degree of 
direct influence, compared to governance by edicts in the case of majority state-owned firms, 
and the subnational governments’ preference to distribute its resources to those firms in which 
they held ownership shares. In addition, the regulator might anticipate a higher effectiveness 
of R&D subsidies in minority state-owned firms because owner-managers in these firms may 
share a long-term motivation to increase R&D investments which differs from the short-term 
profit-orientation of private-owned firms. 
On the provincial level, we can confirm that more market-oriented governments also limit 
the instances of intervention by R&D grants. Conversely, governments more directly involved 
in resource allocation also favor active regulation and employ R&D subsidies more often. 
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Finally, firms located in more developed provinces indeed receive more support through 
China’s innovation policy than firms in more backward regions, affirming the central 
government’s strategy to support development of the coastal region throughout the time 
period 2001 to 2006. 
Based on the propensity scores obtained from Model (3), we perform nearest-neighbor 
matching and match every treated observation with the most similar control observation from 
the pool of potential control observations. As common support is a necessary condition for the 
validity of the matching estimator, we exclude 6 treated observations because no common 
support could be found. To improve the accuracy of the match, we require exact matching for 
the following stratification criteria: time periods, prior R&D subsidies as well as inventor, 
high-tech, and ownership status. Although the p-value of the chi2-test in Model (3) confirms 
that industry controls have no joint significance in explaining the allocation of R&D 
subsidies, we require a precise separation between manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
firms. For later analysis, by restricting the maximum distance between neighbors to a 
tolerance level of 0.1, we disregard another 134 observations. From the pool of control 
observations 95% are used not more than three times and 68% are only used once throughout 
the matching process.  
Table 5 and Table 6 present means, standard deviations, and the p-values of the t-test on 
mean differences for all regressors and propensity scores before and after matching. Before 
matching, 11 out of 15 regressors have significantly different means. After matching, the p-
values of the t-tests on mean differences indicate that no significant differences remain. 
Accordingly, t-tests on mean differences between propensity scores show that p-values 
increase from < 0.001 to 0.992. As a final test, Model (4) in Table 4 re-estimates Model (3) 
with the matched data and confirms that no single regressor remains significant in explaining 
the allocation of R&D subsidies, while pseudo R2 is reduced from 0.28 to 0.02 accordingly. 
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5.2 Effectiveness 
After studying grant allocation, we investigate the effect of R&D subsidies on own R&D 
investment of firms based on the following outcome equation: 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . In 
accordance with our econometric strategy, outcome is measures by net R&D intensity while 
treatment enters the equation as a binary operationalization of R&D subsidies.19 We do not 
This setting enables us to estimate the subsidy effect for recipients in comparison to similar 
non-recipients with a probability of receiving the subsidy. Because we are methodologically 
intrigued by the question in how far the reduction of selection bias changes the perceived 
effectiveness of the treatment, we start with an OLS estimator.20 Under the naïve assumption 
of random selection, we identify a positive effect of R&D subsidies, which is significant at 
the 5% level. This result reflects the additionality reported by prior studies on China which 
simply ignore the issue of selection bias.  
Hereafter, we re-estimate the outcome equation with the matched sample to rule out 
selection on observables.21 The effect of R&D subsidies turns negative and insignificant – 
suggesting neutrality. This result is similar to the findings of Cheng & Chen (2006), who 
draw the same conclusion for private firms in Zhejiang province after performing nearest-
neighbor matching. Based on the matched sample, we finally adjust the outcome equation by 
taking first-differences ∆𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽∆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  to rule out selection on observables and on 
time-constant unobservables. We obtain a negative treatment effect, significant at the 1% 
19 Although we observe the amount of R&D subsidies we only consider the incidence of treatment instead of 
treatment intensity. Calculating the subsidy effect for K different levels of treatment intensity would require a 
split of recipients’ observations into K+1 treatment groups and corresponding control groups. However, for this 
exercise the number of available observations is too small and would result in poor matching results as well as 
less robust DID estimations. 
20 Note that the OLS estimation is based on the complete sample with 7,008 observations. All following 
estimations rely on the matched sample with 686 observations. This sample has non-missing observations for 
first-differences of the outcome and treatment variable as well as non-missing observations for 1 and 2 period 
lags of the treatment variable. By performing all estimations with the same sample we rule out that results are 
influenced by the selection of observations. 
21 For all estimations in this section we calculate bootstrapped standard errors (using 500 replications) as 
suggested by Lechner (2002), since the repeated use of control observations in the matching procedure makes the 
calculation of the actual estimation variance more complicated. 
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level, which suggests partial or full crowding-out. Speaking in favor of our econometric 
strategy, starting from a naïve OLS estimation the stepwise elimination of selection bias based 
on observables by PSM and additionally on time-invariant unobservables by DID 
considerably changes the results of the three specifications. The following analysis relies on 
the last specification to eliminate selection bias to the largest extend. 
In Table 8 we focus on potential differences between instantaneous and lagged effects. 
The coefficients for R&D grants lagged by 1 and 2 periods turn positive but insignificant and 
decline in magnitude, suggesting neutrality in later periods. These findings are similar to the 
results presented by Lach (2002) for Israel and Lv & Yu (2011) for China. Thus, it seems that 
public funds instantaneously reduce own R&D investment of firms but have no effect on the 
funding of R&D projects in later periods – suggesting that firms use R&D subsidies for an 
immediate reduction of their own expenses for R&D while keeping their R&D portfolio 
unchanged. 
Having obtained these results, in Table 9 we provide robustness tests. First, we use the 
R&D stock weighted by the capital stock as an alternative outcome variable. This stock 
measure is more reflective of the firm’s long-term R&D strategy and less sensitive to annual 
changes than the flow measure R&D intensity. Nonetheless, our results are confirmed as we 
find a negative instantaneous effect, significant at the 5% level, and positive but insignificant 
lagged effects. Second, we re-estimate our original specification but exclude non-
manufacturing firms. Again, our results are confirmed as we find a negative instantaneous 
effect, significant at the 1% level, and positive but insignificant effects in the following 
periods. In summary, our robustness tests confirm instantaneous crowding-out and 
insignificant lagged effects. 
In the remainder, we report further investigations in Table 10 and calculate the magnitude 
of crowding-out. First, we examine whether treatment effectiveness of repeated recipients 
differs from recipients who have not received R&D subsidies throughout the last 2 years. 
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Since our matching routine imposes an exact match of stratification criteria, we can split the 
sample accordingly. Indeed, we confirm a negative effect for firms who have not received 
R&D subsidies throughout the last 2 years, significant at the 5% level, but a negative and 
insignificant effect for repeated recipients. This difference in effectiveness is in line with 
Aschhof (2009) and Hussinger (2008) who report an increase of effectiveness for repeated 
receivers in Germany. In the Chinese context, this finding suggests that continuous grants do 
not substitute own R&D expenditures of firms but are used for additional R&D projects.  
Next, we consider if the target recipients of China’s R&D programs, inventive and high-
tech firms, experience a higher effectiveness of treatment. As before, we split the sample 
between inventors and non-inventors and re-estimate our standard specification. However, we 
fail to confirm a difference since both coefficients are negative and significant at the 10% 
level. We perform the same exercise for high-tech and non-high-tech firms. For the latter 
group, we find a negative treatment effect, significant at the 5% level, suggesting crowding-
out. Nonetheless, we find no significant effect for high-tech firms and conclude neutrality. 
This result suggests a comparatively better use of grants and is quite plausible since the 
competitiveness of high-tech oriented firms largely depends on R&D and makes these firms 
more likely to invest R&D grants in additional R&D projects instead of scaling down own 
R&D.  
Finally, we investigate implications of ownership. We find negative and significant 
effects, at the 5% level, for private-owned firms and majority state-owned firms. In contrast, 
we identify neutrality effects for minority state-owned firms. These findings are largely in line 
with our previous considerations and suggest again that minority state-owned firms are indeed 
superior recipients in comparison to the other ownership types.  
We close this section by calculating the magnitude of the average crowding-out effect 
based on our complete sample in the year 2006. R&D expenditures of all firms amount to 
7.66 billion RMB while subsidized firms contribute 1.10 billion RMB. Dividing the 
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coefficient of our standard specification by the mean of net R&D intensity (-0.054 / 0.24), we 
calculate that public R&D funds repel 22.31% of net R&D expenditures of recipients. Thus, 
the net R&D of treated firms in the hypothetical situation of non-treatment was 1.10 billion 
RMB × 122.31% = 1.34 billion RMB. Therefore, grants decrease net R&D by 0.30 billion 
RMB (1.34 billion RMB × -0.223). R&D subsidies received by firms in our sample amount 
to 0.62 billion RMB. On average, 1 RMB of R&D subsidies substitutes 0.49 RMB of net 
R&D (-0.30 billion RMB / 0.62 billion RMB). Thus, we can conclude that China’s R&D 
subsidies are causing an average partial crowding-out effect with the proportion of 2:1. 
6 Conclusion 
This study investigates the allocation of R&D subsidies and the effect on firms’ own R&D 
investments for the population of Chinese listed firms throughout the time period 2001 to 
2006. For allocation, we find that firm participation is positively determined by prior grants, 
high quality inventions, and minority state-ownership. Provincial variation in grant 
distribution reveals that R&D subsidies are less often employed by more market-oriented 
provincial governments and that China’s innovation policy is more supportive of firms 
located in developed provinces. Considering effectiveness, we find that R&D subsidies 
instantaneously crowd-out own R&D investment of firms but are neutral in later periods. In 
2006, one public RMB reduces own R&D investments of firms by half a RMB.  
For repeated recipients, high-tech firms, and minority state-owned firms R&D subsidies 
have an insignificant effect on firms’ own R&D investments. To a large extend, these firm 
characteristics reflect those characteristics that seem influential in the allocation of grants. 
With respect to policy implications of our findings the government should continuously 
allocate grants to firms in order to enhance grant effectiveness. The targeted allocation of 
grants to high-tech firms and minority state-owned firms is reasonable. However, the 
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effectiveness of China’s R&D subsidies could potentially be improved by requiring a more 
rigorous matching of public funds with own funds – as prevalent in international best practice. 
In conclusion, the overall economic justification for China’s R&D programs throughout 
the time period 2001 to 2006 is questionable since we fail to identify additionality effects of 
R&D grants on firms’ own R&D investments. Our findings are affirmative to the more 
general observation by Hu & Jefferson (2008) that the influence of government grants on 
China’s industrial R&D is most likely not significant. In addition, in 2012 China’s intensity of 
industrial R&D investments to GDP has reached 1.51% while the ratio of gross R&D 
expenditures to GDP is as high as 1.98% (MOF 2014, NBS 2014). This trend is reflected by 
our firm level data and shows that the incidence of market failure in the production of 
knowledge may be less severe than in other economies. Against this background, we 
acknowledge that the “Medium- to Long-term Plan for Science and Technology Development 
(2006-2020)” has provided considerable changes to China’s innovation policy and future 
research should examine if the effectiveness of R&D subsidies has improved after 2006. In 
addition to direct subsidies, future research could also address the effect of R&D-related tax 
incentives in China. 
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Appendix: Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1: Taxonomy of Subsidy Effects 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
Map 1: Location of Firms 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
 
Table 1: Firm-level Studies on China 
Authors Literature Period No. obs. Firm selection Dep. var. Subsidy-level Prior Subsidy  
Lagged 
Subsidy Method Effect 
Cheng & Chen (2006) EN 2001-2003 6,732 Private-owned R&D expenditures Firm-level Yes Yes PSM Neutrality 
Cheng & Zhao (2008) CN 2004-2005 324 Private-owned R&D expenditures Firm-level No Yes OLS Additionality  
Guo et al. (2014) EN 1997-2007 ~70,000 Tech-SMEs New products, exports, 
annual patent grants 
Project-level No No PSM, 
Heckman 
Positive 
Hu & Zhou (2008) CN 1999-2004 6,038 Tech-SMEs R&D expenditures Project-level No No OLS Additionality  
Huang et al. (2013) EN 2007 500 Private-owned Innovation expenditure 
intensity 
Firm-level 
 
No No CLM Positive  
Liu (2009) CN 2005-2007 507 Tech-firms R&D intensity Firm-level No Yes OLS Additionality  
Liu et al. (2012)a CN 2009-2011 165 Tech-start-ups R&D expenditures Firm-level No Yes OLS Additionality  
Liu et al. (2012)b CN 2007-2009 n/a Listed firms R&D intensity Firm-level No Yes Logit, 
Probit 
Inverse U-shape 
Lv & Yu (2011) CN 2007-2008 1,442 Listed firms R&D intensity Firm-level No Yes OLS Crowding-out 
Xie et al. (2009) CN 2003-2005 3,890 Listed firms R&D binary Firm-level No Yes Logit, 
Heckman 
Positive 
 
 
 
 
 
The Matching Protocol 
 
Step 1  Specify and estimate a probit model to obtain the propensity score ˆ ( )P X  
Step 2   Restrict the sample to common support: delete all observations on treated firms with  
  probabilities larger than the maximum and smaller than the minimum in the potential control 
  group. (This step is also performed for other covariates that are possibly used in addition to the 
  propensity score as matching arguments) 
Step 3  Choose one observation from the subsample of treated firms and delete it from that pool 
Step 4   Calculate the Mahalanobis distance between this firm and all non-subsidized firms in order to 
  find the most similar control observation. 1( ) ( )ij j i j iMD Z Z Z Z
−′= − Ω − where Ω  is the  
  empirical covariance matrix of the matching arguments based on the sample of potential 
  controls. We use caliper matching, first introduced by Cochran and Rubin (1973). The intuition 
  of caliper matching is to avoid “bad” matches (those for which the value of the matching 
  argument jZ  is far from iZ ) by imposing a threshold of the maximum distance allowed  
  between the treated and the control group. That is, a match for firm i is only chosen if  
  j iZ Z ε− < , where 𝜀𝜀 is a pre-specified tolerance 
Step 5   Select the observation with the minimum distance from the remaining control group. (Do not 
  remove the selected controls from the pool of potential controls, so that it can be used again.) If 
  the control group is empty after applying the caliper threshold, the treated firm is dropped from 
  the sample and is not taken into account in the evaluation 
Step 6   Repeat steps 3–5 for all observations on subsidized firms 
Step 7   Using the matched comparison group, the average effect on the treated can thus be calculated 
  as the mean difference of the matched samples: 1 / T T CTT i i
i i
n Y Yα = −  
 
∑ ∑
 with CiY

being 
  the counterfactual for i and Tn  is the sample size (of treated firms) 
Step 8   As we perform sampling with replacement to estimate the counterfactual situation, an ordinary 
  t-statistic on mean differences is biased, because it does not take the appearance of repeated 
  observations into account. Therefore, we have to correct the standard errors in order to draw 
  conclusions on statistical inference. We follow Lechner (2001) and calculate his estimator for 
  an asymptotic approximation of the standard errors 
 
Source: Czarnitzki & Lopes-Bento (2013). 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Min. Max. Median Std. dev. Obs. Firms 
R&D subsidy  0.104 0 1 0  7,008 1,331 
Prior R&D subsidy  0.111 0 1 0  7,008 1,331 
Prior non-R&D subsidy  0.436 0 1 0  7,008 1,331 
Patent stock 0.007 0 0.416 0.001 0.026 2,325 607 
Patent citation intensity 0.038 0 7.34 0 0.195 2,325 607 
High-tech industry  0.16 0 1 0  7,008 1,331 
High-tech export intensity 0.043 0 0.871 0.001 0.108 2,390 649 
Majority state-owned firm  0.325 0 1 0  7,008 1,331 
Minority state-owned firm  0.386 0 1 0  7,008 1,331 
Private-owned firm  0.289 0 1 0  7,008 1,331 
Market-orientation provincial govs. 7.929 -16.4 10.48 8.17 2.316 7,008 1,331 
ln(provincial GDP per capita) 9.692 8.108 10.959 9.664 0.651 7,008 1,331 
Provincial GDP per capita 20,098 3,320 57,480 15,746 13,984 7,008 1,331 
ln(size) 7.329 2.303 13.003 7.423 1.262 7,008 1,331 
Size 3,398 10 443,808 1,674 12,450 7,008 1,331 
ln(capital intensity) 12.487 9.072 19.333 12.347 1.138 7,008 1,331 
Capital intensity 829,478 8,712 248,917,376 230,231 5,800,353 7,008 1,331 
Profitability  0.861 0 1 1  7,008 1,331 
Exporter  0.341 0 1 0  7,008 1,331 
ln(age) 2.134 0 4.644 2.197 0.527 7,008 1,331 
Age 9.664 1 104 9 5.794 7,008 1,331 
Gross R&D intensity of R&D performer (%) 0.751 0.001 4.938 0.406 0.899 1,707 460 
Net R&D intensity of R&D performer (%) 0.731 0 4.92 0.39 0.892 1,707 460 
Net R&D stock/capital stock of R&D performer (%) 6.639 0 54.98 3.207 9.056 1,707 460 
 
Table 3: Industry Composition 
  All firms  Subsidized firms 
 Industry   No. firms         (%)         
 
  No. firms         (%) 
Agriculture  33 2.48  9 2.74 
Mining  23 1.73  1 0.30 
Manufacturing: food & beverages  63 4.73  15 4.56 
Manufacturing: textiles & apparel  58 4.36  22 6.69 
Manufacturing: wood & furniture  5 0.38  1 0.30 
Manufacturing: paper & printing  29 2.18  6 1.82 
Manufacturing: petro-chemistry & plastics  156 11.72  34 10.33 
Manufacturing: electronics  39 2.93  7 2.13 
Manufacturing: metal & non-metals  135 10.14  23 6.99 
Manufacturing: machinery & instruments  239 17.96  79 24.01 
Manufacturing: pharma & biological products  85 6.39  28 8.51 
Manufacturing: other  12 0.90  2 0.61 
Utilities  58 4.36  6 1.82 
Construction  20 1.50  4 1.22 
Transportation and Warehousing  74 5.56  18 5.47 
Information Technology  38 2.86  5 1.52 
Wholesale and Retail  102 7.66  26 7.90 
Real Estate  42 3.16  16 4.86 
Social Services  56 4.21  4 1.22 
Communication and Culture  4 0.30  1 0.30 
Conglomerates  60 4.51  22 6.69 
Total  1,331 100  329 100 
 
Table 4: Probit Estimations on the Allocation of R&D Subsidies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Parsimonious excl. industry controls  
Parsimonious incl. 
industry controls 
Final specification 
before matching 
Final specification 
after matching 
Prior R&D subsidy   1.462*** -0.034 
   (0.079) (0.125) 
Prior non-R&D subsidy   0.344*** -0.000 
   (0.067) (0.128) 
Patent stock by employees t-1 -0.023 -0.035 -0.042 0.091 
 (0.028) (0.036) (0.04) (0.118) 
Patent citation intensity t-1 1.135*** 1.049** 0.749** -0.831 
 (0.414) (0.425) (0.332) (0.994) 
High-tech industry t-1 0.207** 0.07 0.11 0.095 
 (0.104) (0.128) (0.105) (0.199) 
High-tech export intensity t-1 -0.251 -0.041 -0.153 0.427 
 (0.64) (0.622) (0.565) (1.041) 
Minority state-owned firm t-1 0.337*** 0.331*** 0.238*** 0.071 
 (0.100) (0.101) (0.081) (0.157) 
Private-owned firm t-1 0.292*** 0.265*** 0.133 0.018 
 (0.103) (0.103) (0.088) (0.171) 
Market-orientation provincial govs. -0.044*** -0.052*** -0.029** -0.017 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.026) 
ln(provincial GDP per capita) 0.421*** 0.438*** 0.209*** 0.075 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.056) (0.093) 
ln(size) t-1 0.024 0.046 0.008 0.07 
 (0.035) (0.039) (0.032) (0.062) 
ln(capital intensity) t-1 -0.042 -0.004 -0.019 0.083 
 (0.036) (0.044) (0.039) (0.068) 
Profitability t-1 0.149* 0.171** 0.063 -0.189 
 (0.081) (0.082) (0.087) (0.16) 
Exporter t-1 0.19** 0.121 0.068 -0.085 
 (0.076) (0.078) (0.069) (0.122) 
ln(age) 0.177* 0.201** 0.079 -0.061 
 (0.093) (0.724) (0.086) (0.166) 
Industry  chi2(18)=25.09 chi2(18)=16.35 chi2(18)=7.43 
  p>chi2=0.122 p>chi2=0.568 p>chi2=0.986 
Year chi2(3)=1.97 chi2(3)=1.96 chi2(3)=6.52* chi2(3)=0.13 
 p>chi2=0.578 p>chi2=0.58 p>chi2=0.089 p>chi2=0.988 
Constant -5.506 -6.063 -3.616 -1.924 
Pseudo R2 0.066 0.083 0.284 0.019 
Observations 4,118 4,053 4,053 686 
Firms 1,150 1,129 1,129 385 
Notes: The dependent variable is the binary operationalization of receiving R&D subsidies. ***, **, * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Potential Control Group and Treatment Group before Matching 
 Unsubsidized obs., N=3,656  Subsidized obs., N=483 p-value of t-test on           
mean differences Variables Mean Std. dev.  Mean Std. dev. 
Prior R&D subsidy 0.080 0.272  0.629 0.483 p<0.001 
Prior non-R&D subsidy 0.376 0.484  0.708 0.455 p<0.001 
Patent stock by employees 0.231 1.566  0.220 0.740 p=0.787 
Patent citation intensity 0.008 0.053  0.021 0.105 p=0.008 
High-tech industry 0.146 0.354  0.208 0.407 p=0.002 
High-tech export intensity 0.013 0.062  0.017 0.065 p=0.308 
Minority state-owned firm 0.367 0.482  0.450 0.498 p<0.001 
Private-owned firm 0.286 0.452  0.344 0.475 p=0.012 
Market-orientation provincial govs. 7.896 2.447  7.825 2.568 p=0.564 
ln(provincial GDP per capita) 9.760 0.618  10.072 0.680 p<0.000 
ln(size) 7.356 1.265  7.382 1.322 p=0.567 
ln(capital intensity) 12.553 1.147  12.458 1.068 p=0.072 
Profitability 0.841 0.365  0.878 0.328 p=0.025 
Exporter 0.322 0.467  0.414 0.493 p<0.001 
ln(age) 2.287 0.419  2.383 0.396 p<0.001 
P(X) 0.085 0.127  0.367 0.241 p<0.001 
 
 
Table 6: Control Group and Treatment Group after Matching 
 Unsubsidized obs., N=343  Subsidized obs., N=343 p-value of t-test on           
mean differences Variables Mean Std. dev.  Mean Std. dev. 
Prior R&D subsidy 0.501 0.501  0.501 0.501 p=1.000 
Prior non-R&D subsidy 0.665 0.473  0.659 0.475 p=0.888 
Patent stock by employees 0.156 0.530  0.190 0.701 p=0.522 
Patent citation intensity 0.011 0.055  0.008 0.037 p=0.570 
High-tech industry 0.152 0.359  0.152 0.359 p=1.000 
High-tech export intensity 0.016 0.064  0.015 0.064 p=0.868 
Minority state-owned firm 0.510 0.501  0.510 0.501 p=1.000 
Private-owned firm 0.289 0.454  0.289 0.454 p=1.000 
Market-orientation provincial govs. 7.974 0.139  7.85 0.144 p=0.589 
ln(provincial GDP per capita) 9.951 0.657  10.005 0.678 p=0.348 
ln(size) 7.339 1.128  7.361 1.354 p=0.836 
ln(capital intensity) 12.39 1.031  12.466 1.09 p=0.411 
Profitability 0.883 0.321  0.857 0.35 p=0.368 
Exporter 0.449 0.498  0.402 0.491 p=0.283 
ln(age) 2.388 0.408  2.282 0.377 p=0.851 
P(X) 0.293 0.235  0.293 0.235 p=0.992 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Comparison of Estimators 
Estimator Dep. Var. Treatment Effect   Obs. 
OLS R&D intensity 
0.07** 
(0.032) 
 
7,008 
PSM R&D intensity 
-0.025 
(0.042) 
 
686 
PSM & DID R&D intensity 
-0.054*** 
(0.021) 
 
686 
Notes: (1) standard errors are in parenthesis. (2) standard errors are generated via bootstrapping (500 replications) and are 
clustered at the firm-level. (3) ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.  
 
Table 8: Comparison of Treatment Lags 
Treatment Lag Dep. Var. Treatment Effect Obs. 
Not lagged R&D intensity 
-0.054*** 
(0.021) 
 
686 
1 period R&D intensity 
0.035 
(0.026) 
 
686 
2 periods R&D intensity 
0.009 
(0.043) 
 
686 
Notes: (1) standard errors are in parenthesis. (2) standard errors are generated via bootstrapping (500 replications) and are 
clustered at the firm-level. (3) ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. 
 
Table 9: Robustness Tests 
Firm Selection Treatment Lag Dep. Var. Treatment Effect Obs. 
All Not lagged 
R&D stock by 
capital stock  
-0.4** 
(0.175) 686 
All 1 period 
R&D stock by 
capital stock 
0.146 
(0.14) 686 
All 2 periods 
R&D stock by 
capital stock 
0.163 
(0.208) 
 
686 
Manufacturing Not lagged R&D intensity 
-0.084*** 
(0.031) 
 
432 
Manufacturing 1 period R&D intensity 
0.049 
(0.04) 
 
432 
Manufacturing 2 periods R&D intensity 
0.03 
(0.065) 
 
432 
Notes: (1) standard errors are in parenthesis. (2) standard errors are generated via bootstrapping (500 replications) and are 
clustered at the firm-level. (3) ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. 
 
 
 
Table 10: Further Investigations 
Firm Selection Dep. Var. Treatment Effect Obs. 
R&D subsidy 
in last 2 years R&D intensity 
-0.03 
(0.03) 344 
No R&D subsidy 
in last 2 years R&D intensity 
-0.092** 
(0.042) 342 
Inventor R&D intensity 
-0.09* 
(0.052) 
 
238 
Non-inventor R&D intensity 
-0.032* 
(0.017) 
 
448 
High-tech R&D intensity 
-0.1 
(0.065) 
 
104 
Non high-tech R&D intensity 
-0.05** 
(0.021) 
 
582 
Private- 
owned R&D intensity 
-0.058** 
(0.029) 198 
Minority  
state-owned R&D intensity 
-0.034 
(0.03) 350 
Majority  
state-owned R&D intensity 
-0.093** 
(0.045) 138 
Notes: (1) standard errors are in parenthesis. (2) standard errors are generated via bootstrapping (500 replications) and are 
clustered at the firm-level. (3) ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
